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Abstract One interesting aspect of the Hwang-case
has been the way in which this affair was assessed by
academic journals such as Nature. Initially, Hwang’s
success was regarded as evidence for the detrimental
effects of research ethics, slowing down the pace of
research in Western countries. Eventually, however,
Hwang’s debacle was seen as evidence for the
importance of ethics in the life sciences. Ironically,
it was concluded that the West maintains its promi-
nence in science (as a global endeavour) precisely
because it has its ethics in place. Bioethics was now
seen as an indispensable part of quality control. In this
article, I will claim that the Hwang case rather reveals
that there is no reason for complacency and that there
are substantial challenges awaiting us. They have to
do with major transformations in the way knowledge
is produced and research in the life sciences is
conducted (such as the increase in pace and scale,
globalisation and the growing importance of ICT and
bioinformation). These transformations call for a
different kind of bioethics. The focus must shift from
duties of autonomous researchers concerning visible
research subjects (“micro-ethics”) to responsibilities
of institutionalised research networks in managing
and processing large amounts of bioinformation
(“macro-ethics”). Concepts such as transparency,
reliability and benefit-sharing will become more
important than concepts such as informed consent.
Basically, it is a resurgence of the tension between the
Kantian and the Hegelian view of ethics. The
contours of macro-ethics will be elaborated notably
as it is emerging in bioethical debates over biobank-
ing and genetic databanks.
Keywords Bioethics . Macro-ethics . Research ethics .
Genomics . Bioinformation . Globalisation .
Biobanking
Introduction: Lessons from the Hwang Case
On 12 March 2004 the South-Korean science celeb-
rity Woo-Suk Hwang announced that his team had
succeeded in cloning human stem cells. He pointed
out that his research was carried out for therapeutic
cloning only, not for reproductive cloning, and that
the breakthrough was likely to have a major impact
for the fight against degenerative disorders such as
diabetes and Parkinson’s disease. Moreover, he
assured his readers of the ethical soundness of his
research, stressing that it was done in compliance with
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ethical rules and standards. Notably, he stated that
“before beginning any experiments we obtained
approval for this study from the Institutional Review
Board on Human Subjects” (Hwang et al. 2004,
1669). He also stressed that donors had donated
oocytes and cumulus cells voluntarily, and that they
had been “fully aware of the scope of our study and
signed an informed consent form” (idem).
Soon, however, rumours began to emerge, notably
concerning the manner in which the egg donors had
been recruited (Nature 429, 490). It was questioned
whether the ethical assessment by the Institutional
Review Board had been sufficiently rigorous. In
short, there was a growing concern over the lack of
transparency surrounding Hwang’s research. Eventu-
ally, it turned out that the basic research material
(human egg cells) had been obtained from team
members, raising serious concerns regarding health
risks, gender issues and the voluntary nature of the
donation. Even the reliability of the data themselves
became an issue. In the end, Hwang admitted that the
findings had been fabricated, and his papers were
retracted (Kennedy 2006). His name became associ-
ated, not with a major breakthrough, but with a major
(and highly visible) case of fraud.
One interesting aspect of the Hwang-case has been
the way in which this affair was monitored and
assessed by the academic research community in the
West. It actually was a tale of two (highly competi-
tive) top journals. Whereas Hwang himself published
his original papers in Science, a train of editorials and
comments on the Hwang case appeared in Nature.
The latter journal obviously felt challenged by what
was happening in South-Korea, as well as in Science.
Initially, in the first series of comments, the Hwang
case was seen as evidence that South-Korea had
become a scientific “superpower”.1 Science was
described in terms of a global competition between
the West and the Far East. Apparently, “Asian tigers”
were winning this science war, notably because of the
detrimental influence of research ethics in the West.
Western researchers were depicted as finding them-
selves in ethical trenches, as being “stranded” and tied
up in a “stalemate” (such as the debate over
reproductive and/or therapeutic cloning, Nature 427,
664). Science in East Asia on the other hand was
described in terms of a Blitz war, a massive attack on
Western positions,2 fuelled by funding on an unprec-
edented scale, allowing South-Korea and other Asian
nations (such as China, Japan and Vietnam) to emerge
as the new frontiers of science (Nature 435, 26, 393).
Western visitors were taken aback by the sheer scale
of Hwang’s research facilities (Nature 429, 13). In
this global competition or “arms race” (Nature 438,
135), institutionalized ethics (committees, regulations,
procedures), in combination with a science unfriendly
“moral climate” (i.e. widespread distrust in science
and technophobia) was seen as delaying and frustrat-
ing scientific progress in Western countries, while in
East Asia scientific progress was apparently “encour-
aged” by a much more science-friendly atmosphere.
Even Hwang himself attributed his success to a
“supportive cultural environment, well-funded labo-
ratories and legislation that permits cloning of human
embryos for research”. Willingness to donate egg
cells by Korean donors was explained by him in terms
of “cultural differences”. He also praised the work
ethic in his lab: “No Saturday, no Sunday and no
holidays” (Nature 427, 664). Compared to the West,
South-Korean science could profit from “national
pride” and a great willingness to serve the common
good (Nature 429, 14).
As the affair was heading for debacle, however, a
dramatic reversal in the comments and editorials in
Nature became apparent, notably with respect to the
role and significance of research ethics. The question
whether ethics constitutes an obstacle for research or
rather a support, was suddenly addressed in a
completely different manner. Life science ethics or
bioethics now emerged as an indispensable monitor-
ing tool, an important aspect of quality control. Tight
regulations were now seen as a strength, rather than as
a weakness. On 17 November 2005 it was said that
the Hwang case showed that, in order to maintain
public support, researchers needed to follow “strict
ethics guidelines” (Nature 438, 257). Skeptics world-
wide had to be persuaded that research in general and
stem cell research in particular was being done
1 “Cloning success marks Asian nations as scientific tigers. The
successful cloning of human embryos by a South Korean team
has alerted Western researchers to the pace of scientific and
technological progress in East Asia”. (Nature, 427, 664).
2 The rhetoric of the arms race was also noticeable when Gerard
Schatten from Pittsburgh University announced his decision to
end collaborations with Hwang’s team: Hwang had now lost
one of his major “Western allies” (Nature 438, 262).
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ethically. If this failed, researchers would “find
themselves on the defensive in proving that they are
ready to stick to strict ethical codes” (idem). And on
12 January 2006 it was firmly stated that “sound
ethics and good research practice go hand in hand”
(Nature 439, 117). The West had won its competition,
its fight for primacy in science (for the time being at
least), precisely because its research ethics was less
flexible and more robust. In other words, Nature
editorials and comments were rediscovering the
importance of ethics, of the ethico-legal infrastructure:
“Research ethics matters immensely to the health of
the scientific enterprise. Anyone who thinks differ-
ently should seek employment in another sphere”
(Nature 439, 118). In countries such as China and
South-Korea, it was argued, “mechanisms for super-
vising ethics and investigating misconduct are at
relatively early stages of development” (117). The
Western system of teaching students about ethics,
“imperfect as it may be, is still more advanced than
that of many other nations” (idem). Finally Gottweis
and Triendl more or less summed it all up by stating
that “good governance is crucial for research” (2006,
141). Although the absence of regulation might allow
research to progress unimpeded, this is not always
beneficial for research: regulatory oversight in the
name of ethics adds an important layer to “the web of
quality control in research” (143). The basic convic-
tion embedded in these Nature comments can be
summarised as follows: Western competitiveness
resided in its ethical, rather than in its technological
“superiority”. The West had safeguarded its promi-
nence precisely because it had its ethics in place.
The suggestion, that “we” (in the West) have our
ethics in place, is questionable. To begin with, the
framing of the Hwang case as an “Asian” problem is
highly dubious. Although Gerard Schatten withdrew
his participation, he did so when the case was already
heading for debacle, while a Western institutional
review board, at the University of Pittsburgh, had
approved his participation. Moreover, the dubious
claim made by Hwang concerning the willingness of
Asian women to put the greater national good ahead
of their own welfare must be seen as part of Hwang’s
rhetorical strategy while under siege and therefore
viewed with skepticism.
In this article I will argue that, although ethics has
indeed become an embedded dimension in the fabric
of knowledge production in Western countries, there
is no reason for complacency. Rather, the Hwang case
is an indication that bioethics worldwide (in the West
as well as in the East) is facing tremendous
challenges. They arise from the ways in which
contemporary research practices are actually evolving
in terms of pace and scale. These transformations put
pressures on our ethical infrastructures and the
question is whether bioethics anywhere in the world
is really “ready” for these developments. I will argue
that in important respects, we are behind schedule.
Basically, mainstream Western science ethics has
developed on the basis of the idea that research is
done by more or less autonomous individuals, able
and willing to take responsibility for their own
research, making their own decisions. In contempo-
rary research practices, however, research is usually
carried out by international and interdisciplinary
teams, by large consortia or networks of more or less
“anonymous” (rather than “autonomous”) researchers.
Some of the basic constituents of traditional bioethics
may have become outdated by the way in which
scientific research practices are actually developing.
Although traditional concepts such as autonomy,
responsibility and informed consent (IC) remain
important no doubt, we have to address a number of
relatively new and complicated issues on the macro-
level as well. On this level, the question is not
whether or why informed consent (for instance) is
important. Rather, the question is how such principles
are to be institutionalised and maintained in a global-
ising and competitive environment.
Whereas the focus of micro-ethics basically is on
the obligations of individual researchers vis-à-vis
individual research subjects, macro-ethics rather
addresses the issue of how moral practices are to be
organised. The focus now shifts from issues such as
autonomy and human rights to issues such as
transparency and participation. This does not mean
that “traditional” concepts such as informed consent
(IC) become unimportant, but we increasingly need to
address them from a different angle. In the context of
an interaction between an individual researcher and an
individual research subject, facing one another, the
issue of IC will be addressed differently than when we
are dealing with (electronic) interactions between
large groups of anonymous individuals, separated
from one another in space and time, in the context of
genetic databanking for example. In the latter case,
the concept of IC will not become irrelevant, of
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course, but will become part of a web of often novel
and complicated questions.
It is possible and even useful, of course, to assess
the Hwang case from the perspective of traditional
science ethics or micro-ethics, as I will call it. Hwang
is then seen as an autonomous researcher who in the
end must be held responsible for what happened in his
lab, and this is an important dimension no doubt.
Such a perspective will highlight aspects such as
Hwang’s failure to treat the women who provided the
eggs respectfully (not only by exerting implicit
pressure on the consent of his junior research team
members, but also by buying over half of the eggs he
used from a Korean egg broker), as well as his
untruthfulness concerning the numbers of eggs he
used. Initially Hwang claimed that he had created
eleven stem cell lines from just over two hundred
eggs, while actually using 2,200 ova to produce
precisely zero stem cell lines (Dickenson 2007). Yet,
if we limit ourselves to such an approach, other
aspects and issues are bound to become eclipsed, such
as “science and culture” aspects (to what extent can
we extrapolate “Western” principles to Asian con-
texts?) or “science and politics” aspects (the political
pressures and expectations involved). South-Korea
had invested significantly in Hwang’s lab and
demanded something in return, products that would
boost the nation’s international status. But this is not
typical for East Asia. For similar reasons, President
Clinton wanted to become associated with the costly
and prestigious Human Genome Project by announc-
ing (on June 26, 2000) its upcoming completion.
Moreover, Hwang’s research was really teamwork and
one may wonder whether and to what extent Hwang
himself (who invested significant amounts of time in
activities such as touring and lecturing) was fully
aware of what was actually going on in “his”
laboratory. In order for such aspects to be addressed,
a macro-ethical perspective is called for.
This paper consists of three parts. First of all, I will
outline some of the changes that are taking place in
scientific research worldwide, in terms of increase of
scale, notably in areas such as genomics. More and
more often, normative issues in science have to do
with assembling and managing huge amounts of
information. I will argue that this development calls
for a different kind of research ethics than the
basically “Kantian” micro-ethic that was developed
during the second half of the Twentieth Century.
Subsequently, I will point out that the shift from a
more or less principle-oriented approach, formulating
obligations between individual agents (micro-ethics),
to a more or less procedural approach, focusing on
governance and transparency, on issues of organisa-
tion and institutionalisation (macro-ethics) is not
without precedent. Basically, it is a “revival” (under
modern conditions) of the tension between the ethical
views of Kant and Hegel, between Moralität and
Sittlichkeit. These dimensions of ethics are not in
opposition to one another. Rather, they must be seen
as complementary, more or less depending on each
other. In the final sections, I will further elucidate the
concept of macro-ethics by means of two examples,
namely the use of animals in biomedical research and
the ethics of databanking or biobanking. The basic
claim of my paper will be that, although micro-ethics
and macro-ethics are both important, we have to
acknowledge that whereas research ethics on the
micro-level is relatively well-advanced, macro-ethics
still finds itself in a rather early stage of development.
While we are relatively “fluent” when it comes to
addressing issues such as autonomy and IC, our
competences on the level of macro-bioethics are
somewhat less developed. Bioethics is already mov-
ing in the direction of macro-ethics, putting more and
more emphasis on ethics as an intrinsic part of science
governance, and I will argue that we should encour-
age ourselves to proceed in this direction.
Do “We” Have our Ethics In Place? The Issue
of Scale
While Gregor Mendel was an isolated researcher,
without a formal research position or research grant
(Orel 1996), and while the structure of DNA was
uncovered by two scientists engrossed in an unofficial
research quest, dropping out from their official
research assignment more or less (Watson 1968/
1996), contemporary research tends to be organised
in the form of large-scale, multi-centre research
endeavours, often involving hundreds of researchers
and huge amounts of funding, bringing together
experts from various fields and backgrounds. Where-
as Mendel published a one-author article, and Watson
and Crick’s famous two-page publication (1953)
involved only two authors, the Nature and Science
publications that announced the completion of the
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“working draft” version of the human genome
(IHGSC 2001, Venter et al. 2001) listed hundreds of
“authors”. This raises a question of a Foucauldian
type: What does it mean to be an author in the
genomics era? (Foucault 1994).3 Or, more generally:
What does it mean to be a scientist, under contempo-
rary conditions of pace and scale? To what extent is it
still possible for individual researchers to constitute
themselves as autonomous, responsible, decision-
making agents?
An important dimension is of course the role of
ICT. The computer has emerged as the generic
research instrument, comparable to the book in
Alexandrian and scholastic scholarship, quickly trans-
forming virtually all research fields, not only in terms
of contrivances for accurate measurement, data
analysis and visualisation, but also in terms of
communication and globalisation. An instrument
originally designed as a powerful calculation machine
was successfully transformed into a communication
device (Licklider and Taylor 1968). Virtually all
scientific disciplines of today have dramatically
changed—in terms of their basic methodology, their
technology, and even their epistemology—because of
ICT. In the computer era, the key words are
information and exchange. From a philosophical point
of view, information is an intriguing phenomenon
(Gaskell and Bauer 2006, 9 ff.; Thacker 2005).
Because it is immaterial, it can migrate quite easily
through electronic channels of communication. It can
be managed, analysed and manipulated in various
ways. Information is multi-functional and can acquire
relevance and meaning in various contexts. Biomed-
ical research has become very much an endeavour of
producing, exchanging and interpreting information
on an increasingly large scale. In many ways, the
Human Genome Project (HGP) can be regarded as a
paradigm for what is happening in the life sciences
more broadly. It exemplifies not only the importance
of scale, management and collaboration, but also of
electronic databases. On the ethical and legal level,
the management of biomedical information raises
complicated issues of ownership and responsibility,
transparency and discretion.
Yet, while research in the life sciences is evolving
into a large-scale, global, collective enterprise of
bioinformation production and exchange, the traditional
focus of life science ethics still tends to be on the
responsibilities and duties of individual researchers (as
autonomous agents) towards individual others that are
physically present. And indeed, Western bioethics has
become quite competent when it comes to addressing
ethical issues on the micro-level (N=1), where the
focus is on respecting the autonomy of visible and
tangible individuals (notably research subjects) in the
context of one-to-one communications. Although this
basic dimension of ethics will never become complete-
ly irrelevant, we cannot claim to have our ethics “in
place” as long as we, as a complementary effort, over
and above micro-ethical concerns, increase our com-
petence to address novel issues emerging on the
macro-level, issues that are an inherent part of research
as a large-scale, global and collective enterprise, where
N=many and individuals as a rule will hardly become
visible as individuals. Bioethics is shifting and has to
shift its focus from the level of personal responsibilities
in face-to-face interactions towards issues of bioinfor-
mation management, critically assessing the best
practices evolving and the governance issues arising—
in short, a more procedural type of ethics. Issues such
as IC will not be regarded as unimportant on this level,
but they will be reframed and readdressed. For instance,
the question will not be whether or why IC is important
per se, but rather how it can be realized and
institutionalized, what best practices have emerged in
various countries and contexts, and how they should be
morally assessed? In other words, the focus shifts from
an approach that basically addresses individual
researchers as autonomous agents to an approach that
looks at research communities as social networks
embedded in political and cultural environments.
It would be a mistake to regard the increase in
scale and pace, or more generally: the transformation
of knowledge production that is currently evolving in
the life sciences, a priori as a threat to ethics or even
to humanity. Rather, the emergence of novel research
practices, although they will challenge established
moral frameworks no doubt, will also provide new
opportunities for positioning and redefining ourselves
3 According to Foucault, authorship has fulfilled various
functions in the course of history. In the scholastic era, it
functioned as a quality mark or guarantee of truth (“Aristoteles
dixit”). In the modern period, attribution of a particular finding
to a particular author (through a formal publication in a
scholarly journal) helped to solve priority conflicts. Nowadays,
authorship has acquired new functions, for example in the
context of retrieval or assessments of the performance of
research groups.
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as responsible moral subjects. Yet, increasingly,
responsibility will become a collective effort that has
to be consciously organised. Issues such as transpar-
ency, trust, professionalism and reliability will be key
concepts in this domain. The same goes for issues
involved in globalisation. Ethical quandaries will
increasingly emerge against the backdrop of global
collaboration and competition, and researchers will
increasingly have to define themselves as moral
subjects on an international scale. This also means
that international institutions (such as UNESCO) will
be expected to play an increasingly important role.
Moralität versus Sittlichkeit
An important point of departure for post World War II
bioethics has been the philosophy of Immanuel Kant
(1724–1804), who formulated the principle that we
should act in such a way that we treat humanity, both
in our own person and in the person of others, not as a
means only, but always as an end in itself (1785/
1903). The question is: how can we use someone (as
a source of information, in the context of an
experiment for instance) and still respect and ac-
knowledge his or her autonomy as a moral person?
The answer is: by asking (informed) consent. This
principle became the cornerstone of research ethics
and was built into countless codes of conduct both
nationally and internationally. The focus, however,
remains on scientist as responsible, individual agents,
on the duties of individual researchers towards
individual research subjects in the context of face-
to-face interactions. The core issue in such an ethic is:
respecting the autonomy of the immediate “other”
(the research subject). The autonomy of this other
must not be subordinated or sacrificed to the interests
of other “others” (notably future patients). Other
“others” are not completely absent from a micro-
ethical perspective, of course, and they may come into
view through extrapolation, but the micro-situation
remains the standard model. In a Kantian ethic,
individuals remain abstract entities, rather than con-
crete individuals acting in concrete situations. Their
consent as rational agents is what counts, not their
biographies or institutional positioning. Kantian ethics
envisions individuals in abstracto. Autonomy is an
“assignment”, moreover, rather than a privilege.
Finally, in a Kantian perspective, autonomy means
that we must dare to think for ourselves, to follow the
imperatives of practical reason. It implies non-
conformity: follow your own rational rules, rather
than conforming yourself to collective strategies of
behaviour.
Although this approach clearly has its strengths, it
obviously has its weaknesses as well. Notably, it fails
to see issues such as IC in a broader context (for
example as a contrivance that facilitates research).4 It
sees human individuals as theoretical entities rather
than as concrete persons working in institutionalised
environments, and therefore, a Kantian approach may
not be very helpful when it comes to addressing the
actual power issues, social factors and inequalities
involved in research settings. Many debates over
informed consent have to do with the “empirical”
question, to what extent the consent given can really
be regarded as voluntary (for example in the case of
research with children, mentally retarded subjects,
students or terminally ill patients)? For this, the social
context, the broader working conditions have to be
taken into account. Contemporary science is now
adding some new concerns to these more “familiar”
issues regarding individuals who may not be as
autonomous as a Kantian ethics presupposes, such
as: what should autonomy and IC amount to in
research practices that take the form of global
exchange of bioinformation and data-driven (rather
than hypothesis-driven) research? How to address
individual rights in the context of data-mining?
The awareness that autonomy, although important,
does not in and of itself allow us to address concrete
issues and actual problems emerging in real-life
contexts is not new. On the contrary, one could say
that this type of criticism was already formulated by
Hegel (1770–1831) in the first decades of the
nineteenth century (1821/1970). He argued that,
although abstract normative principles directed to-
wards guiding behaviour on the micro-level are
important, we have to take the societal environment
into account as well. Hegel referred to this as
Sittlichkeit or “ethical life”. On this level, the focus
shifts from abstract principles (addressing individual
subjects) to the ways in which these principles are
realized or institutionalized. To frame it in contempo-
rary terms: attention is now given to practices of
4 Cf. the Hwang case: building an IC procedure into the trial
becomes a technical ingredient in setting up a research design.
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application and implementation that are actually
developing. In order for IC (for example) to work,
we need a supportive ethical environment, a societal
atmosphere in which such principles are regarded as
important, not only by individual actors, but by large
numbers of people. Society is then seen as a collective
enterprise, where N=many. Individual actors emerge
as participants in complex networks that guide and
facilitate (or discourage) certain types of behaviour.
Conformity with existing practices and established
lines of behaviour now becomes a positive feature.
Ethics must focus its attention on these practices, the
routines and guidelines they involve, by asking
questions such as: how to implement normative
principles and keep them up-to-date? This type of
ethics will assess the functioning of ethical commit-
tees and of ethical expertise rather than analyzing the
precise meaning of the word “autonomy”. On the
level of Sittlichkeit, ethics is not about face-to-face
interactions, but rather about responsibilities of
researchers in general towards large numbers of
anonymous, invisible others. Hegel’s view is not that
Moralität is unimportant. Rather he insists that
autonomy remains an abstract idea that somehow
has to come to life, has to function in concrete
settings on the macro-level, in the form of institutions
and policies.5
Finally, macro-ethics allows us to loosen the
association of ethics with anthropocentrism. Kantian
ethics is basically about the duties of one particular
moral subject towards another, where “moral subject”
is identical to “human being”, since (according to
Kant and his followers) only humans are open to
moral reasoning and susceptible to the voice of
conscience. Macro-ethics, however, addresses the
moral qualities of institutions, organizations and
regulations, of research practices as such. Sustainabil-
ity, for example, is a concept that is difficult to
acknowledge within a Kantian framework, but from a
macro-ethical perspective a normative assessment of
research practices from the point of view of sustain-
ability obviously makes sense.
I am not claiming that macro-ethics is more
important than micro-ethics. Rather, they must be
seen as complementary dimensions. Sooner or later,
issues such as IC, initially emerging in a micro-
setting, will have to be addressed on a macro-level as
well. I am not suggesting that macro-ethics is
inexistent. On the contrary, macro-ethical issues have
received due attention in various contexts, but it is my
conviction that the life science as they are evolving
today entail new challenges that will predominantly
have to be addressed in macro-terms. Historically
speaking, research ethics (notably the ethics of
biomedical research) originated in the context of
experimentation with human subjects. Worldwide
rejection of the use of prisoners during World War II
greatly reinforced general awareness of the pivotal
importance of IC. The (macro-ethical) question how
to institutionalise biomedical research ethics has
always been on the agenda as well. The post-war
resurgence of ethics resulted in the establishment of
bioethics committees as a basic tool for safeguarding
autonomy. Issues such as the meaning and status of
ethical expertise or questions concerning the role of
ethics committees—for instance, should consensus
formation be regarded a viable objective? (Ten Have
and Sass 1998)—have been thoroughly debated.
Procedures for ethical assessment became an inherent
part of research activities. Still, the starting point
remained the Kantian question “What ought I to do?”
and the emphasis was on the autonomy of individuals
who participated in research trials. The way biomed-
ical and biological research is now evolving, however,
forces us to broaden our perspective. I will elucidate
this by means of two examples.
A First Exemplification: Animals in Biomedical
Research
The discussion over the use of (vertebrate) animals in
biomedical research may stand as a first “problem
file” to exemplify the shift indicated above. Until
recently, the focus in this debate was on basic ethical
concerns, such as animal suffering, animal rights, the
integrity of animals and intrinsic value. Participants in
ethical debate tried to convince one another that
animals have (or do not have) basic rights, that they
have (or do not have) intrinsic value, that they should
(or should not) be regarded as subjects of experience,
5 The book The imperative of responsibility by Hans Jonas
(1979/1984) may also be mentioned in this respect. Jonas
argues that, whereas traditional ethics basically concerns itself
with immediate and small-scale duties involved in interactions
between individuals here and now, the new powers of science
and technology force us to broaden the scale of our normative
thinking in terms of time and space.
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etcetera. On a theoretical level, advocates of utilitar-
ianism for example would argue that the amount of
suffering is all-important while Kantians would argue
that only those entities can have rights that may
acknowledge the rights of others (and this apparently
only applies to humans). On a more practical level,
the issue of how to balance animal suffering against
the interests of future patients was addressed on the
level of basic considerations that somehow had to be
traded-off against one another.
In recent years, however, the emphasis has shifted
quite unequivocally to a different set of issues, a
different type of questions, of a much more procedural
nature. Moral deliberations and concerns nowadays
tend to focus on the adequacy, efficiency and
transparency of the assessment process of animal
research as it is carried out by animal ethics
committees and other institutionalised bodies. What
kinds of expertise should be represented in such
committees? What should be their role and, above all,
how transparent should the process be? To what
extent should commissions share their input, their
considerations and their output with the outside
world? How confidential is the information handled
by those involved? In other words, the focus has
moved from basic principles and concepts to proce-
dural issues and to the moral quandaries involved in
the management of “sensitive” bioinformation.
One important procedural issue is representation.
Can we leave the decision making to the expert
committees, or should the public be involved, or at
least informed, and how should this be organised?
Should it be made public for instance how many
animals are used and for what purposes? Or would
such a policy conflict with concerns of confidentiality
when dealing with vulnerable intellectual property
such as research proposals? Who exactly is responsi-
ble for making decisions in this domain (researchers,
committees, institutes?) and how are these decisions
made? In other words, how is the process of moral
deliberation institutionalised and organised? What
best practices have evolved in various countries? Is
global harmonisation or research regulation possible?
To what extent can experts involved in this process be
trusted by the public? Who are they representing?
These are normative issues, no doubt, but they
approach the issues at hand from a different angle.
Moreover, animal research has become an international
and even global endeavour. Strict regulations on the
national level may not reduce the amount of animals
used for research, nor the suffering to which they are
exposed, but may rather stimulate the migration of
research activities to other geographical areas where
regulations are less severe, or to competing research
networks (unless harmonisation can be established, for
example on the European level). Research with
animals basically produces information, and this
implies that the actual site where the research is
conducted is of relative importance. Information can
be exchanged, in the context of global networks, and
the actual work with animals may migrate to
countries where legal constraints are relatively mild.
One could say that, to the extent that research has
become a global affair, research ethics has to become
a global affair as well, in order to remain effective.
Thus, the focus of concern has shifted from debates
over the value and status of living entities to debates
over the management of information. The latter
includes issues such as transparency, accessibility,
reliability and confidentiality.
Biomedical Research in the Bioinformation Era
My second example concerns the use of bioinforma-
tion (notably genetic information) in research. As was
indicated above, the focus of biomedical research
practices is changing. Globalisation, “informatisation”
and the increase of scale are omnipresent features of
contemporary bioscience. Besides trials involving
visible and tangible research subjects (patients,
students or others), another source of information is
becoming increasingly important, namely databases
containing bioinformation provided by anonymous
(and often healthy) individuals. A biobank is a source
of data for researchers, physicians, patients and others
and exemplifies the growing importance of bioinfor-
mation in research and health care. It can be defined
as an interface between individuals (patients or
healthy individuals) providing data or bodily materi-
als on the one hand, and biomedical researchers using
these data and materials on the other. Professionals
involved in biobanking have the obligation to provide
high quality, accurate data, while at the same time
respecting the rights of privacy and confidentiality of
the providers. The growing importance of biobanking
implies a dramatic change for research ethics, a shift
of focus from practices involving interactions be-
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tween visible individuals to novel practices consisting
in the management and interpretation of information,
notably genetic information, where individuals usual-
ly remain invisible.
This change has been clearly outlined by Collins
(1999) in a famous article in which he presents the
HGP as exemplifying an ongoing paradigm shift in
medicine and biology: the dawning of the information
era. According to Collins, the HGP is basically an
effort to sequence our genetic code, making the
information available to research communities world-
wide through a public repository (GenBank, www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov). According to Collins, genomics
changes the way in which biomedical and biological
research is done. Research subjects or patients as
embodied individuals are no longer the main target of
this type of research. Rather, genomics is directed
towards producing, using and interpreting (genetic
and other forms of) bioinformation. This has con-
sequences for ethical or societal research as well. In
the context of the HGP, the use and interpretation of
information was identified as the first high priority
area for ELSI (ethical, legal, social issues) research
(Collins 1999, 34). In Collins’ vision, future individ-
uals will (on the basis of interactive electronic IC
procedures) increasingly use genetic tests based on
knowledge retrieved from large-size databases before
making important decisions (such as career choice).6
Thus, in the “genomics” or “bioinformation” era, the
focus of biomedical research will shift towards novel
practices based on using and interpreting information
provided by large populations.
It is no coincidence, therefore, that a growing part
of the bioethical literature is devoted to issues
involved in genetic databases and biobanking. The
traditional biomedical and bioethical situation (the
encounter between researcher and research subject) is
complemented (and to a certain extent eclipsed) by a
novel situation in which large numbers of (often
healthy) individuals provide information to databases.
In the traditional encounter, the Kantian “What ought
I to do?” was answered in terms of the categorical
imperative demanding professionals to treat humanity,
represented by this one tangible, visible individual, as
an end in itself. Biobanking, however, exemplifies
research under different conditions, on a much larger
scale, involving completely different kinds of inter-
action between researchers and research subjects,
mediated by electronic devices. Individuals are
basically providers of data. In principle, they remain
anonymous and invisible. Indeed, while their infor-
mation continues to be stored, managed and pro-
cessed in electronic libraries, they themselves may no
longer be alive. Communication is virtual and digital.
Discrete human beings are replaced by stored infor-
mation as the object of data-driven research. In order
to adequately address the ethical issues involved in
such practices, we need a biomedical research ethics
for collective enterprises devoted to management of
sensitive bioinformation on a large scale. The fact that
scientific research has become a complex, technolo-
gy-dependent enterprise may increasingly outdate the
focus of traditional bioethics on individual duties
towards the discrete moral subjects we are facing. The
shift in focus from individuals (N=1) to populations
(N=many) and from encounters with individuals who
are physically present to exchange of bioinformation
calls for a different approach.
The conviction that the emergence of biobanking
implies new challenges for bioethics is clearly
addressed by Knoppers and Chadwick (2005). Popu-
lation-based genetic research, they claim, has led to
calls for rethinking the paramount position of the
individual in ethics. Whereas individual-oriented
ethics will place much emphasis on principles such
as IC, in the new situation other issues become
important, such as solidarity and trust.
This explains why notably in ethical debates over
biobanking and genetic databanking authors are
moving beyond the more or less traditional agenda
of bioethics. According to Williams (2005), our
“dominant focus on individual rights [is] ill-suited”
when it comes to reflecting on issues involved in
large scale collaborative research (51). The most
important dimension that the IC language fails to
address, he claims, is that of power. Individuals are
confronted with large-scale, highly professional
organizations functioning in electronic environments.
An IC procedure will not allow us to address the
6 A similar position was taken by Collins’ competitor Craig
Venter, who characterized the research facility Celera he set up
as “an information company” (Shreeve, 120), a source of
genomic information on a global scale, a massive database that
could be consulted by researchers, but also by individuals who
wanted to govern their own health condition on the basis of
genomic information. Indeed, Celera’s formal mission state-
ment was to become the “definitive source of genomic
information” worldwide.
Bioethical Inquiry (2008) 5:283–293 291
moral quandaries emerging in such a situation:
“requiring consent will not, by itself, alter the fact
that uncoordinated individuals are always subject to
the power of organised groups or institutions” (53).
Indeed, a focus on individual rights may even “hinder
us in appreciating the ethical issues that large-scale
biobanks raise” (51). Important social, political and
scientific questions are left out of consideration.
Apparently, there is a growing conviction that
biobanks and bioinformatics databases introduce new
types of conflict and tension that cannot be addressed in
terms of the traditional bioethical toolbox. One of these
conflicts is that between the scientific ideal of free
access to detailed, up-to-date bioinformatics databases
(an important methodological condition, but an ethical
ideal as well) and the traditional ideal of informed
individual autonomy (Bovenberg 2005). In order to
“harvest” the new potentials for life-sciences, research-
ers will often want to make use of databases in a much
more flexible manner, in various contexts and for
various purposes. Yet IC procedures set limits to the
use of biobank information (Bovenberg 2005). In order
to articulate the interests of individuals who act as
sources of information, other ethical tools and con-
cepts, such as benefit sharing or engagement in
agenda-setting for research, may become much more
important than IC. In other words, the management of
biomedical information generates new questions
concerning accessibility of information, priority setting
and fairness. Individuals, patient organizations, even
the public at large may well become more interested in
co-developing the agenda for research than in the legal
intricacies of IC. Similar to the shift towards proce-
dural issues in animal ethics such as transparency, there
is a growing interest in the biomedical field in moving
away from the traditional ethics expert committee
model (applying micro-level principles to cases and
research applications) towards developing methods to
involve much broader audiences in moral deliberations,
through panels, surveys, discussion forums and other
ways of consulting and involving “publics”. This
again reflects the desire to move away from the
traditional IC issues towards broader ones such as: for
what purposes (or even: for which research programs)
do we as a society find the use of animals in research
legitimate?
All this implies that bioethicists should be more
interested in the collective responsibilities of research
communities engaged in exchanging and interpreting
bioinformation than in the personal (immediate)
duties of researchers on the micro-level. Research
ethics has become part of science governance as a
comprehensive approach in which privacy regulations
constitute only one element among various other
considerations. Issues involved in institutionalisation
at various levels (the role of ethics committees and of
various forms of expertise, the process of quality
control, priority setting and funding policies, regu-
lations for managing electronic databases) will in-
creasingly determine the bioethical agenda. Besides
IC, other normative concepts (free access, transpar-
ency, benefit sharing, open source IP policies, public
engagement) will gain importance. And as far as IC is
concerned, the focus will be on how it is to be
organized, maintained and balanced against other
important normative issues.
Moreover, IC procedures must not be seen as
evolving in a moral vacuum. Rather, they presuppose
a supportive moral culture or climate—a “moral life”
as Hegel phrased it. IC remains an abstract issue as
long as the legitimacy and trustworthiness of institu-
tions involved in research practices (locally as well as
globally) are left out of consideration. This is also a
basic lesson from the Hwang case. In a world of
global competition and collaboration it becomes
increasingly important to ensure that standards of
oversight in laboratories worldwide are sufficiently
adequate for making the Hwang scenario increasingly
“improbable” (Nature 439, 117). This calls for trans-
national institutions, moral “players” in the global
field of science ethics.
One of the candidate institutions for playing such a
role is UNESCO, author of documents like The
Human Genome and Human Rights and Declaration
of human norms in bioethics and Code of Conducts
for Scientists, but this is a contentious issue. First of
all, in many respects these UNESCO documents are
still addressing researchers from a classical (micro-
ethical) perspective, as autonomous individual agents.
They do not really enable research communities to
manage the moral quandaries that are emerging in
contemporary science as a large-scale, global enter-
prise. They build on established ethical principles,
rather than on a solid analysis of how life science
research is actually evolving within society. More-
over, in the editorial to a special issue of Developing
World Bioethics, the latter UNESCO declaration has
been fiercely criticized (Landman and Schüklenk
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2007). It was argued that the concepts used in this
document were too general and vague to generate
real commitment and, moreover, that UNESCO was
not supposed to issue such declarations at all.
According to the authors, bioethics should be left
to the bioethicists. Although I do not find the argu-
ments used for criticising this document very
convincing (Zwart 2007), the debate as such indi-
cates that the development of a global macro-ethics
still finds itself in an early, “prenormal” stage.
Moreover, organisations such as UNESCO are just
as much a product of global forces as are researchers
and their organisations. So far, national institutions
play a much more prominent role in safeguarding the
ethical standards for research than international
bodies.
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